examine the recent claims, by Carrasco et al. and Schenider (2006) that involuntary attention increases the phenomenal contrast of a stimulus. Tsal, Shalev, Zakay, and Lubow (1994) performed the first experiments that directly manipulated attention to determine the effect of attention on phenomenal contrast. They conducted two kinds of experiments. In the first set of experiments, they manipulated attention with a spatial cue that indicated the most likely location of the stimulus (e.g., Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980) . Since the cue was informative as to the stimulus location, this is a manipulation of voluntary attention (Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005) . In several experiments they found when the stimulus was in the cued location, it was judged to have less contrast than when it was in a noncued location. Hence, they claimed that attention reduces brightness contrast. They also manipulated involuntary attention with the simultaneous presentation of two stimuli, asking which stimulus was brighter. This paradigm was identical to the one used by Carrasco et al., and we will discuss Tsal et al.'s results using this second paradigm later. Tsal et al. concluded that attention (whether voluntary or involuntary) decreased brightness contrast.
In a series of 8 experiments, Prinzmetal, Nwachuku, Bodanski, Blumenfeld, and Shimizu (1997) examined the effect of attention on brightness and contrast.
The critical task was to indicate the brightness of a gray square on either a white or black background. Observers responded in one of three ways: (1) by selecting a location on a palette that went from black to white; (2) by selecting one of five gray samples that matched the target in brightness; (3) by verbally responding with the number 1 to 5 to indicate the brightness of the target. (The latter method was used by Tsal et al., 1994 .) Two different dual-task manipulations of attention were investigated. The critical task was always to indicate the brightness of the gray target. The other task was a letter identification task. In one manipulation of attention, the letters were either near the gray target or far from the gray target.
The assumption was that it is easier to attend to two objects that are near each other than far from each other (Hoffman, Nelson, & Houck, 1983) . The second manipulation of attention was that the gray target and letters either came on simultaneously or successively. The assumption was that simultaneously processing the stimuli from two tasks demands more attention than processing the information from one task at a time. Hence, in the simultaneous condition, observers would have less perceptual resources available for the brightness judgment task (Gardner, 1973; Hoffman, 1979; Prinzmetal & Banks, 1983) . All of the attention manipulations and methods of measuring brightness had the same result: Attention increased the accuracy of observer's judgments, but it did not systematically change the brightness or contrast.
results and the results of Tsal et al. (1994) using an informative spatial cue. Prinzmetal et al. were able to replicate the previous results and demonstrate that the results of Tsal et al. were due to the manner that observers responded and the particular training regime used by Tsal et al. 2 Prinzmetal and his colleagues investigated the effect of attention on a wide variety of stimulus properties including hue (color), line orientation, line length, spatial frequency and location (Prinzmetal, Amiri, Allen, & Edwards, 1998; Prinzmetal, & Wilson, 1997; Prinzmetal, 2005) . They used a variety of manipulations of attention and response methods. In nearly every case, attention had a clear effect on performance: Attention made observers more accurate, but it did not cause any shifts in perceptual judgments. Perhaps a critical aspect of all of these experiments was that the stimuli were above threshold and there was no location uncertainty. 3 The specific purpose of the present research is to examine a recent report by Carrasco, Ling, and Read (2004) . In contrast to , who found that voluntary attention increased the accuracy of judgments of brightness or contrast, and Tsal et. al. (1994) , who found that attention decreased perceived contrast, Carrasco et al. reported that automatic or involuntary attention increased perceived contrast. In Carrasco et al., on each trial two Gabor stimuli were briefly presented. The stimuli were either oriented 45° clockwise or 45° counterclockwise from vertical. The task in the two main experiments was to indicate which Gabor stimulus had the higher contrast and what was the orientation of that stimulus. One Gabor stimulus (the standard) always had the same contrast. The other stimulus (the test) varied in contrast from less than to greater than the standard.
Automatic or involuntary attention was manipulated by presenting a cue (i.e., black dot) just above one of the Gabor stimuli, 116 ms before the stimulus appeared (see Figure 1 ). This is a manipulation of involuntary attention since the location of the cue was uncorrelated with the location of the higher contrast Gabor stimulus. The results were that the psychometric function was shifted for the cued Gabor stimulus relative to the uncued stimulus. That is, there was a tendency to select the cued stimulus as the one with higher contrast. The authors used two contrast ranges, one near threshold (Experiment. 1) and one with slightly higher contrast (Experiment 2), in two otherwise identical experiments. In both experiments, they found the same results: Attention increased the tendency for observers to select the cued stimulus as having higher contrast.
Recently, Schneider (2006) , using a wide range of brightness and contrast levels, replicated Carrasco et al., but only when the stimuli were very near (or below) threshold. Schneider used dots rather than Gabor stimuli, and the cue was an annulus surrounding the dot. Schneider concluded that attention increased contrast, but only for low contrast stimuli (consistent with the view of Ebbinghaus, 1908) .
To understand Carrasco et al, we began with replication of their work.
Carrasco and her colleagues kindly sent us the program that they had used to run their Experiments 1 and 2. We were able to create our stimuli by running their program (their Experiment 2) and taking a screen snapshot of their standard stimuli. We then very carefully crafted our Experiment 1 to be similar to their Experiment 2 (higher contrast stimuli). In our Experiment 1, below, we replicated their results.
In Experiment 2, we increased the contrast of the stimulus, and consistent with Schneider (2006) , the noninformative spatial cue had no effect. This pair of findings is in agreement with the hypothesis that involuntary attention increases contrast, but only for low contrast stimuli. We believed it was important to replicate Carrasco et al. (2004) and Schneider (2006) because without replication, we could not be sure that we had captured the essential features of their effects.
Having replicated both Carrasco et al. (2004) and Schneider (2006) , we tested an alternative explanation based on a guessing bias. With low contrast stimuli, observers might not perceive the Gabor stimuli on some trials, but they may assume that there was something in the cued location. They would do this because the cue is a visual transient, and the Gabor stimulus is also a visual transient. If observers believe that something was in the cued location, then logically that something must have had higher contrast than the uncued location where nothing was perceived. Schneider (2006) used two different tasks. One task was similar to Carrasco et al.: Observers responded which stimulus had greater contrast. In the other task, observers responded whether the two stimuli were the same in contrast or not. Our alternative (guessing bias) explanation applies to both tasks. In the same-different task, if the transient cue biases observers to believe a stimulus had been presented in the cued location, and nothing was perceived in the uncued location, the observer would then conclude that the stimuli were different in contrast.
We tested this alternative hypothesis in three ways. In Experiment 3 we used a detection task. If involuntary attention increases contrast, it should increase d' for cued stimuli. If the spatial cue is having its effect by changing bias, it should not increase d' but rather change the observer's criterion so that observers are more likely to make false alarms. In Experiment 4, we reversed the temporal order of the Gabor stimuli and the cue. If the cue has its effect on perceptual processes it should not influence performance if it comes after the stimulus (for similar arguments, see Liu, Pestilli, & Carrasco, 2005; Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005; Woodman, Vecera, & Luck, 2003) . On the other hand, if the same effect was obtained when the cue appeared after the stimulus, it would suggest a postperceptual mechanism. In the final experiment, unbeknownst to observers, on 20% of the trials there was no stimulus in either the cued or the uncued location.
Increasing the contrast gain on a blank location should not result in the perception of a Gabor stimulus of higher contrast. Therefore, if the previous effects were due to bias, observers should choose the cued blank location as having more contrast than the uncued blank location.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiments 1 and 2 was to replicate the effects of Carrasco et al., 2004 and Schneider (2006) . Experiments in different labs are never precisely the same in every detail. Without replicating the results of previous findings, we cannot be sure that we have captured the essential features of the previous research. Hence our comparisons with Carrasco et al. and Schneider's began with replications of their results.
The goal of Experiment 1 was to conduct a replication of Carrasco et al. that was sufficiently similar to their Experiment 2 so as to yield the same results as they obtained. Our standard stimulus was created from their computer program as described below. There were some differences between their experiment and ours.
These differences are noted below.
Method
Procedure. The procedure is illustrated in Figure 1 . A fixation dot was present throughout a block of trials. On each trial, a cue (black dot) was presented for 67 ms. On 1/3 of the trials, the left location was cued, on 1/3 the right location was cued, and on 1/3 the cue replaced the fixation dot (center or neutral cue). After an interval of 50 ms., two Gabor stimuli were presented for 40 ms., one on each side of the fixation point. Subsequent to the presentation of the Gabor stimuli, the observer responded as to the location and orientation of the Gabor stimulus with the higher contrast. Observers responded by pressing one of 4 keys on the keyboard: 'z' or 'x' if the left Gabor stimulus had higher contrast; '.' or '/' if the right Gabor stimulus had higher contrast. The keys 'z' and '.' were used if the stimulus was rotated counterclockwise and 'x' and '/' were for clockwise rotation.
Thus, as with Carrasco et al., one button press indicated the orientation and location of the stimulus with higher contrast. The response assignment was identical to Carrasco et al. Observers were told that there was no relation between the cue and the stimulus with the higher contrast.
We were not clear as to one aspect of the procedure of Carrasco et al. Their paper indicated that observers had to respond within one second, whereas the software provided to us did not have any fixed response window. Also the paper did not mention the consequences of not responding quickly enough. Hence we ran 2 groups of observers. One group of observers was urged to take their time and be as accurate as possible. The other group had to respond within one second. If they did not respond within one second, when they did eventually responded, the computer emitted a "beep" tone. Observers exceeded the time limit on only 1.6% of trials. At the end of each block, observers were given the percentage correct on the orientation judgment, but no other feedback was given. For the no time-limit group, the experiment took about 50 minutes, for the time-limit group, it took about 30 minutes.
Each observer was given a minimum of 2 practice blocks of 48 trials. If their performance was below 50% on the orientation judgment, they were given additional blocks of practice. Data was collected in 4 blocks of 192 trials per block.
Stimuli. The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor controlled by a Macintosh G3 computer 4 in a dark room. The Gabor stimuli were created in the following way. We modified the software of Carrasco et al.'s computer program so that each Gabor had the contrast of the standard. We then took a screen snapshot (using Snapz™ computer program) of the standard. We created 4 test stimuli by taking the standard and decreasing/increasing the contrast of the standard. Thus there were two test stimuli above and two below the contrast of the standard. The luminance values of the highest and lowest pixels in the stimuli are given in Table 1 . 5 The measurements in Table 1 were made with a spot photometer with the lighting at which the experiment was run, from the viewing distance of the observer.
There were a few differences between their program and ours. They used 23
different test values; we only used 4. Since most of their effect was when the test values were close in contrast to the standard value, we wanted to get as much data in that region as possible. We only used the high frequency stimuli because their effect was largest with the high frequency stimuli. Because of a limitation in their software, to get enough distinct luminance values their stimuli were luminancevarying shades of green, where ours used shades of gray. Also because of differences in monitors, our stimuli were somewhat higher in contrast than theirs (see Table 1 ) and higher in frequency (7 cycles/degree). In all other respects, we attempted to make our experiment as identical to theirs as possible. Nevertheless, because of the difference in stimuli and procedure, it was necessary to replicate their results.
Observers were seated 100 cm from the monitor and their heads were stabilized with a chin rest. At this viewing distance, the distance between the centers of the Gabor stimuli subtended 3.7° visual angle (they used 4°). The other components of the stimuli (e.g., fixation point and cue) were identical so that when we superimposed screen snapshots of their stimuli and our stimuli, we could detect no differences.
Observers. Six observers, ages 18 to 22, participated in each group. In all the experiments reported here, approximately 1/2 the observers were male and 1/2 female. Observers were recruited from the subject pool of the Psychology Department at the University of California, Berkeley and were given course credit for their participation.
Results and Discussion
The proportion of trials on which observers responded that the test Gabor stimulus had greater contrast than the standard stimulus is plotted in Figure 2 as a function of which item was cued (center, standard, or test). Confidence intervals were calculated as described by Loftus and Masson (1994) for a mixed design experiment. When the test item was cued, observers were more likely to respond that it had higher contrast than when the standard item was cued ( Figure 2 ). We conducted an ANOVA with cue type, test contrast value, and group (time limit vs.
no time limit) as factors. There was a significant effect of the cue (F(2,28) = 3.13, p < .01) indicating that observers were more likely to respond with the cued location. There was also a significant interaction of group (time limit, no time limit) and which test stimulus was presented, F(3,42) = 3.68, p < .01. Essentially, the no time-limit group had a steeper psychometric function (i.e., performed better) than the time-limit group.
Not including the trials with a center cue, observers had a strong tendency to respond with the cued location (whether standard or test). In the time-limit group, (mean = 60.0%). In the no time-limit group, all of the observers responded more than 50% of the time that the cued location was the location with the higher contrast (mean = 59.0%).
In summary, we replicated Carrasco et al. However, there was one more observation we found curious. We compared the accuracy of orientation judgments when the higher contrast item was cued, and when the lower contrast item was cued. A correct response would be the orientation of the higher contrast item.
When the location judgments are incorrect, the orientation judgments should be at chance (i.e., observers are responding on the basis of the wrong stimulus). When observers got the location incorrect, the orientation judgments were 47.2% correct when that item was cued and 51.9% correct when it was not cued. As expected, these values are close to chance.
When observers got the location correct, they got the orientation correct on an average of 76.9% of trials. One might expect that if observers attend to the cued location, they would be more accurate at the orientation judgments for targets in that location. However, this was not the case. For the time-limited group, observers were actually significantly less accurate on the orientation judgment when the higher contrast stimulus was cued than when the other stimulus was 
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was an exact replication of the time-limited group in Experiment 1, except the contrast of the Gabor stimuli was increased (see Table 1 for the exact values.) Eighteen observers were recruited as in Experiment 1.
The results are shown in Figure 4 . There is evidence reported by Carrasco et al. that also suggest that their effect was larger with low-contrast stimuli. Their cue effect was larger in their Experiment 1, which used lower contrast stimuli than their Experiment 2. Also, their effect was larger with high-frequency gratings, which at the viewing distance used, are more likely to be near or below threshold.
Given our results, one might conclude that attention increases the apparent contrast of stimuli near threshold (as did Schneider, 2006) . There is an alternative, explanation, however. It is possible that on trials in which observers didn't perceive the Gabor stimuli, they assumed that a Gabor stimulus was in the cued location. They might make this assumption because they saw a flicker in that location (i.e., the cue) and therefore infer that there must have been something in that location. Alternatively, they may lower their detection threshold for the cued location compared to the uncued location. Consequently, if they assumed there was "something" in the cued location and they did not see anything in the noncued location, then the logic of their response could be summarized as "something" has higher contrast than "nothing". Such a bias would only occur with stimuli near threshold. Furthermore, if observers were asked which location had the least contrast, this bias would cause observers to choose the location that was not cued.
In Carrasco et al. Experiment 3, this is precisely what was found. The purpose of our Experiment 3 is to compare the explanation that a noninformative cue affects perceived contrast only for low-contrast stimuli with the explanation that the results reflect a bias to assume the cued location contained a Gabor stimulus.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was a detection experiment. For half the observers, we used the standard Gabor stimuli used in Experiment 1 (low contrast) and for the remaining observers, we used the standard from Experiment 2 (high contrast). In the left location, there was a 50% probability that a Gabor stimulus would be present, and on the right there was a 50% probability that a Gabor stimulus would be present. Thus there were 4 kinds of trials: (1) on 25% of the trials, there was no stimulus; (2) on 25% there was a stimulus only on the left; (3) on 25% there was a stimulus on the right; and (4) on 25% there was a stimulus in both positions.
Observers made two separate responses (one for the left and one for the right position). Independently, one of the two positions was cued. Observers were told the proportion of the 4 kinds of trials, and that the cue was not correlated with the presence of a stimulus.
For the low-contrast stimuli, if the noninformative cue attracted attention, and therefore made the stimuli higher in contrast and therefore more visible, one would predict that d' would be higher in the cued location than in the noncued location. In other words, the proportions of hits (i.e., p(hit)) would be higher, and the proportion of false alarms (i.e., p(FA)) would be lower in the cued location.
On the other hand, if the consequence of the noninformative cue is to affect observer's bias, then the criterion to respond "present" should be lower in the cued location. In other words, both p(hit) and p(FA) should be higher in the cued location. We ran the high-contrast group in order to obtain detection performance with the stimuli used in Experiment 2, but we did not expect the cue to have any effect since performance would be near ceiling.
Method
The sequence of stimulus events was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
On each trial, there could either be 0, 1 or 2 stimuli, as described above. Observers used the keyboard keys 'x' and 'z', respectively, to indicate whether the left position contained a Gabor stimulus or not. They used the '.' and '/' keys, respectively, to indicate whether the right location contained a Gabor stimulus or not. Observers could enter the responses in any order they wished. They were encouraged to take their time and be as accurate as they could. Unlike the previous experiments (and Carrasco et al.) observers were given trial-by-trial feedback.
When they erred, a computerized voice said, "left wrong" and/or "right wrong."
Each observer participated in at least 2 practice blocks of 48 trials each, and then 3 blocks of 192 trials. The orientation of the Gabor stimulus was randomly determined on each trial. Observers were informed of the proportion of present and absent trials, and also that the cue was not informative as to the presence of a Gabor stimulus. Only peripheral cues were used.
Results and Discussion
The results are presented in Table 2 . For the low-contrast group, observers' sensitivity, as measured by d', was significantly lower for the cued location than for the uncued location, d' = 1.01 vs. 1.51, t(11) = 3.27, p < .05, 2-tailed. If involuntary attention increased the perceptual contrast of the stimuli, then observers would have been more accurate with the stimuli in the cued location.
The reason that they were less accurate is discussed below.
We measured observer's criterion, C, as follows:
Observers had a much less stringent criterion for the cued location, compared with the uncued location, .363 vs. 1.00, and this difference was reliable, t(11) = 4.00, p < .05. In other words, the cue increased both hits and FA in the same direction, indicating a shift in bias.
Considering the criterion results, it is not surprising that observers were actually less accurate (measured by d') for the cued than the uncued location. If on some trials, observers mistook the cue for the Gabor stimulus (since they were both visual transients), or assumed that something must have been in that location, the false alarm (FA) rate would have been driven up for the cued location, driving down d'. The FA rate was three times higher for the cued than the uncued location (Table 2) The results for the high-contrast group are not very remarkable. The cue had no significant effect on d' or criterion. The sensitivity for the cued and uncued locations were d' = 5.06 and 5.17, respectively (t(5) = 0.75, ns). The corresponding criterion measures for the cued and uncued locations were C = -.09
and .03, respectively (t(5) = 1.11, ns). This lack of difference is expected since observers were near perfect in performance. We included the high-contrast group in the detection task only to verify that the stimuli in Experiment 1 were near threshold, whereas those in Experiment 2 were clearly above threshold.
Experiment 4
Experiment 3 demonstrated that observers could be biased to believe that a Gabor stimulus was in the cued location. However, a detection task is different from the task used in Experiments 1 and 2 and by Carrasco et al., where observers were asked the orientation of the Gabor stimulus with higher contrast. Hence in Experiments 4 and 5 we returned to the original paradigm.
Our explanation of the results of Carrasco, et al. and Schneider is that observers have a nonperceptual bias to believe that a Gabor stimulus appeared in the cued location. One way to compare an explanation based on perceptual processes and one based on nonperceptual processes is to reverse the timing of the cue and target (Liu, Pestilli, & Carrasco, 2005; Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005; Woodman, Vecera, & Luck, 2003) . If the cue comes after the stimulus, it cannot have any effect on the perception of the stimulus. Rather, effects from a cue that appears after the stimulus must reflect nonperceptual processes.
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 (time-limit group) except that the cue appeared 50 ms. after the target disappeared. As in the previous experiments, the cue duration was 67 ms. We eliminated the center cue condition so as to have as much data as possible for the critical conditions (cue test and cue standard). Each of 12 observers had a minimum of 3 blocks of 32 trials of practice and 4 blocks of 192 trials on which data was collected.
Results and Discussion
The proportion of trials on which observers responded with the test Gabor stimulus as a function of whether the test stimulus or the standard stimulus was cued is shown in Figure 5 . As in Experiment 1, observers were more likely to respond that the test stimulus had greater contrast when it was cued, despite the fact that the cue appeared 50 ms. after the target was removed. Observers were significantly more likely to respond that the test stimulus had greater contrast when it was cue than when it was not (F(1,11) = 32.49, p< .01).
One might be tempted to argue that perception takes place over time, and without a post-stimulus mask, perceptual analysis was still occurring when the cue appeared. Thus the cue might still affect perception. However, even if this were the case, one would predict that the effect of the cue would be greater when it preceded the stimulus than when it followed the stimulus. The effect of the cue is as substantial for this experiment as Experiment 1 (compare Figures 2 and 5 ).
The manipulation of having the cue after the stimulus has been used to discriminate perceptual and nonperceptual processes (e.g., Liu, Pestilli, & Carrasco, 2005; Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005; Woodman, Vecera, & Luck, 2003 Because the present experiment was similar to Experiment 1, time-limited group, we checked to see whether we replicated the results of that experiment with regard to orientation judgments. When observers got the location incorrect, they got the orientation correct on 47% of the trials, which is close to chance. However, when they got the location correct, they were correct on the orientation on 75.9% of the trials. Like Experiment 1, orientation judgments were significantly less accurate when the higher contrast item was cued than then it was not cued, 73.5%
vs. 78.2%, t(11) = 2.86, p < .05. This finding reinforces our interpretation that on some trials, observers do not perceive the Gabor stimuli. If they have a bias to report that there was something in the cued location, then they will guess the orientation of the stimulus in that location even though they did not perceive anything in that location. Such guesses would be at chance, lowering the accuracy of location judgments when the higher contrast item was in the cued location.
In the final experiment, we tested our hypothesis that the previous results were due to a bias by testing how observers would respond when there was no Gabor stimulus in either position. The experiment was precisely like Experiment 1, time-limited group, except on 20% of the trials on which data were collected, there were no Gabor stimuli in the display. Increasing the gain on nothing should result in nothing. Hence, if the spatial cue is increasing contrast, on the targetabsent trials there is no reason for observers to select the cued location over the uncued location. However, if the visual transient of the cue biases observers to think that were was a Gabor stimulus in the cued location, then they should be more likely to respond that the cued location had higher contrast even though there was nothing in that location.
This experiment was inspired by the observation that some observers complained in Experiments 1 and 4 that on some trials, they did not perceive anything. In a sense, the target-absent trials play the same role as in the detection experiment: They reveal the non-perceptual biases.
The experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except for the following.
Observers began with 3 blocks of 32 practice trials. As in Experiment 1, if they were below 50% correct orientation judgments, they were given additional practice. The practice blocks did not contain any Gabor absent-trials.
Following practice, observers were tested with 4 blocks of 200 trials per block. On 20% of these trials, no Gabor stimuli were present. This fact was not mentioned to the observers. As in the previous experiments, at the end of each block observers were given their percent correct on the orientation judgments, but this percent did not include the target-absent trials because, of course, there was no correct response on these trials. Seventeen observers participated.
The critical results in this experiment are the responses on trials on which (unbeknownst to observers) there was no Gabor stimulus. On these trials, observers selected the cued location as having higher contrast than the uncued location (62.1% vs. 37.9%) even though there was nothing in either location. 16 of 17 observers were more likely to select the cued location as having higher contrast than the uncued location. Assuming that the probability of selecting the cued location was 50%, this was significantly greater than chance (t(16) = 5.63, p < .01).
Results from the target-present trials are shown in Figure 6 . As in the previous experiments observers were significantly more likely to respond that the test stimulus had higher contrast when it was cued than when the standard stimulus was cued, F(1,16) = 32.42, p < .01.
As in Experiments 1 and 4, we examined performance on orientation judgments when the location was correct. Unlike the previous experiments, the accuracy on the orientation judgments when the location was correct was not influenced by the cue (66.7% for cued and 66.7% for noncued trials). On the target-present trials, observers performed less well in this experiment (the psychometric functions are not as steep) perhaps because observers became more discouraged by the difficult of performing the task when, unbeknownst to them, there occasionally was no Gabor stimuli.
General Discussion
In Experiment 1, we replicated Carrasco et al. (2004) : Observers were more likely to respond that a cued stimulus had higher contrast than an uncued stimulus.
In Experiment 2, we increased the contrast of the stimuli and the effect disappeared, consistent with Schneider (2006) . One interpretation of these results is that involuntary or automatic attention increases the contrast of low contrast stimuli, but has little effect on high contrast stimuli.
We presented an alternative hypothesis: The tendency to select the cued location results from a non-perceptual bias. With very low contrast stimuli, observers may believe that something appeared in the cued location whereas they did not perceive anything in the uncued location. We tested this in three ways.
Experiment 3 was a detection experiment and observers had to make independent decisions about the presence of a Gabor stimulus in each position. The measure of detectability, d', was actually lower for the cued location than the noncued location. On the other hand, the criterion to believe that a stimulus was present was lower in the cued location. The cue increased hit rate, but also substantially increased false alarm rate.
In Experiment 4, we returned to the procedure used by Carrasco et al. (2004) . However, the cue appeared after the Gabor stimuli. The results were the same as in the first experiment: Observers were more likely to report that the stimulus in the cued location had higher contrast than the uncued stimulus. Postcueing procedures have been used to compare perceptual and nonperceptual processes with the argument that if the cue appeared after the stimulus has disappeared, it does not have an opportunity to affect the perception of the stimulus. Even if the processing of the stimulus extends over time, one would expect that a perceptual effect of the cue would be larger when it precedes the stimulus than when it follows the stimulus, and this was not the case.
The final experiment was a replication of the initial experiment, except that on 20% of trials, no stimulus was present. On these stimulus-absent trials, observers consistently selected the cued stimulus as having greater contrast than the uncued stimulus.
Our explanation of the cueing effects reported by Carrasco et al. (2004) and Schneider (2006) is that the results are due to a bias to believe that something appeared in the cued location. Carrasco et al. did acknowledge and test a possible bias account of their data. However, their bias explanation is different from ours.
They tested, and rejected, the possibility that observers would have a tendency to respond with the cued location regardless of the task. Thus when asked which location had less contrast, observers still had a tendency to respond with the uncued location. Our explanation is consistent with this finding. Suppose on a given trial, the stimuli are at or below threshold so that the observer does not have a strong impression of a stimulus at either location. If the left location is cued, the observer might believe that there was a stimulus at that location either because there was a visual transient in that location (the cue) or because they lowered their criterion (in SDT terms) for that location. If one then asked, which location had less contrast, it would have to be the right location because the observer thought there was something in the left location, but not the right location.
The method used by Carrasco et al. (2004 ), Schneider (2006 and Tsal et al. (1994, Experiment 4) A number of investigators have been concerned that the results of attention experiments reflect processing of the target stimulus as opposed to not knowing which location contained the target (e.g., Luck, Hillyard, Mouloua, & Hawkins, 1996; Shiu & Pashler, 1994) .
The problem of location uncertainty is not limited to low contrast stimuli.
Consider a recent study by Liu, Pestilli, and Carrasco (2005) . Observers were presented simultaneously with two Gabor stimuli: a stimulus that was rotated slightly clockwise or counterclockwise from vertical (the target) and a vertical
Gabor stimulus (the distractor). A noninformative cue was presented before the stimuli. Observers had to indicate the orientation of the target. Targets and distractors were very similar. Observers may have been uncertain as to which stimulus was the target. If they were biased to respond with whatever information was in the cued location, then on trials on which the distractor was cued would have been worse than when the target was cued because the observer was basing the response on the wrong stimulus. Finding that orientation judgments were more accurate when the target was cued does not mean that the cue changed the perceptual representation. Rather it may mean that observers have a bias to believe that the target was in the cued location. 6 Observers are responding with the information in the cued location, but that does not mean that the information in that location is enhanced.
To test this hypothesis, Gould, Wolfgang, and Smith (2006) performed an experiment similar to Carrasco et al., but with two conditions. In one condition there was location uncertainty. In the other condition, the target location was marked with high contrast lines that indicated the target location ("fiducial markers"). They found that that observers were more accurate on the cued than the uncued location only when the fiducial markers were not present.
Whenever this paradigm is used, various kinds of bias and location uncertainty are present. A safer method is to have one stimulus and ask observers to judge the brightness or contrast of that single stimulus against a standard.
Furthermore, one should ensure that observers know which location contained the target (e.g. . Using this more standard spatial cueing paradigm, without location uncertainly, it is possible to have accuracy higher in the cued location, but only with an informative spatial cue (e.g., Prinzmetal, et al. 2005a) There are many cases in the literature where voluntary or endogenous attention does make perception more accurate even when there is clearly no location uncertainty (e.g., Luck, Hillyard, Mouloua, & Hawkins, 1996; Prinzmetal, McCool, & Park, 2005; Prinzmetal, Amiri, Allen, & Edwards, 1998) . These are cases where the allocation of attention is goal-directed: It is strategically advantageous to allocate perceptual processing resources to a particular location or object. In these cases, attention improves performance.
One might ask what of the observation by Ebbinghaus (1908) and others that a faint stimulus (e.g., the ticking of a watch) is not detected unless one is attending to the stimulus? There are several examples in the literature where a stimulus would have been detectable in terms of luminance energy, yet because the observer was not attending, it was undetected (e.g., Mack, 2003; Mack & Rock, 1998; Rensink, O'Regan, & Clark, 2000) . Attention can influence detectability. Energy contrast can increase detectability. However, it does not follow that attention increases phenomenal contrast. Such an argument would be equivalent to claiming that "Windsurfing makes me happy. Doing research makes me happy. Therefore, windsurfing makes me work (or work makes me windsurf)." Unfortunately, these activities cannot be done at the same time.
The difference between the effect of attention on detectability and phenomenal contrast might explain the paradox pointed out by James (1890).
James thought that if one does not attend to a faint stimulus, it may not be perceived. Yet, if we are aware of a stimulus, attention does not seem to increase its intensity. We know today that attention may limit access to consciousness of stimuli that would otherwise have sufficient stimulus intensity to be perceived.
There is little doubt that voluntary attention does alter the appearance of objects. From various lines of evidence it is clear that voluntary attention alters appearance in terms of enhancing processing so that our perception of what we are attending to is more veridical (e.g., Prinzmetal, Amiri, Allen, & Edwards, 1998; Prinzmetal, & Wilson, 1997) . Attention should make our interactions with the world more successful, and it can only do this by making our perceptions more accurate, not shifting them. We have called this idea attentional constancy (e.g., . Like lightness constancy, attention should lead to a more veridical perception of the world. Consider the task of a mammal foraging for ripe fruit. Most mammals do not have color perception. It might be that the ripe fruit (e.g., red tomatoes) and unripe fruit (green tomatoes)
can be discriminated on the basis of brightness contrast. The ripe fruit might have higher contrast with the background than the unripe fruit. As the animal scans the environment, if attention changed contrast, unripe fruit might appear to be ripe fruit. To be a useful mechanism in an evolutionary sense, attention should not lead us astray. responded that the test stimulus had greater contrast than the standard stimulus as a function which item was cued (standard or test). Note that the cue appeared after the stimulus. Figure 6 . Experiment 5. On Gabor present trials, the proportion of trials on which observers responded that the test stimulus had greater contrast than the standard stimulus as a function which item was cued (standard or test). Figure 4 . Experiment 2. The proportion of trials on which observers responded that the test stimulus had greater contrast than the standard stimulus as a function which item was cued (center, standard, or test). responded that the test stimulus had greater contrast than the standard stimulus as a function which item was cued (standard or test). Note that the cue appeared after the stimulus. Figure 6 . Experiment 5. On Gabor present trials, the proportion of trials on which observers responded that the test stimulus had greater contrast than the standard stimulus as a function which item was cued (standard or test).
1 James notes several examples where he believed that attention makes a sensation "stronger than it would be otherwise" (p. 425), but he noted a paradoxically "the intensification brought about by attention never seems to lead us astray (p. 426). 2 Tsal et al. had observers memorize numbers to correspond to different gray levels. Consider a particular gray stimulus on a black background. That stimulus would appear brighter than it was. If during practice observers adjust their responses to be as accurate as possible, they adjust the response categories accordingly. They would do this more on easy blocks (with attention) and difficult blocks (without attention). replicated Tsal et al., when observers responded with numbers, but not when they responded in a matching task. 3 In each experiment there was a way to objectively demonstrate that the stimuli were above threshold. For example, in many experiments there were catch trials without a stimulus. Observers were always nearly perfect at detecting catch trials.
